Digital Twinning: Use and Abuse

Digital twinning holds great promise as a solution to a myriad of issues and problems confronting the Department of Defense, but like so many other “in vogue” terms before, only if properly defined and implemented.  The reason why Apple, Inc. appears able to introduce a new I-Phone every Christmas resides in the commercial world’s ability to digitally twin microelectronics, removing bugs and faults before full blown manufacturing its next generation product. A cursory review of acquisition delays and weapon systems programmed budget overruns facing the military reveals that the Department of Defense could gain from adopting more such commercial best practices.

Digital twinning is a process in which a physical object, system or entity is recreated on a virtual interface, and as applied to manufacturing, is some twenty years old.  During manufacturing, a fully developed digital replica is constructed for the purposes of future testing, development, and experimentation. Simply put, it is a digital replica or a clone that provides its manufacturers with the ability to interact with it on a digital platform instead of testing on a real physical “twin” in reality.

The method that is used to replicate a physical object does require having specific technology equipment for Digital Twinning to be successful.   The most efficient way to replicate a product, piece of machinery or any other physical object is to attach structural sensors that act as boundaries, helping the digital platform accurately replicate the shape and form of the object. Digital Twin sensors accurately detect and represent the product’s electricity circuits (if it is a product that has a functional purpose that is executed by electricity e.g., a computer) on the digital platform. Businesses take full advantage of the twinning process, accruing huge benefits in bringing products to market.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy spoke of the need to streamline rapid, iterative approaches from development to fielding.   Leading electronics manufacturing trend watchers such as Gartner will attest to the commercial relevance of digital twinning in manufacturing of microelectronics.

However, time and again, the Department of Defense has taken off on one acquisition and reform crusade only to be caught up in its own jargon and terminology sans results.  Many current Administration leaders should be familiar with the term Better Buying Power, as they coined it over a decade ago.  The fact there are some half dozen new acquisition and budget reform commissions currently under the authority of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2021 attest to the fact we have more reforming to do.

After a Hurricane devastated Tyndall Air Force Base, leaders looked to ways to rebuild the base smarter.  They embraced digital twinning.  At a recent Association of the U.S. Army event, Army leadership spoke of digitally twinning every installation by 2035.  While having a digital representation of brick and mortar and energy needs have value in planning, and it is a laudable goal to incorporate modern manufacturing thinking, the risk is in losing sight of true value of a concept.  Much like the desire to audit the Department of Defense $800 plus billion budget is a nice tag line, the past 30 years of wasted billions of dollars spent getting no further to the goal is a waste – and I personally spent a decade on that pyrrhic challenge.

Last week, the Government Accountability Office released its latest report on the F-35 fighter program.  As the GAO states, “the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter program remains DoD's most expensive weapon system program. It is estimated to cost over $1.7 trillion to buy, operate, and sustain.”   Its latest block of manufacturing, Block 4, are three years behind schedule, and costs continue to rise due to higher costs associated with upgrading crucial hardware and testing upgrades, among other things.  However, digital twinning is still a largely unexplored concept for the F-35 program managers.  And institutional, bureaucratic, and cultural hurdles abound.

As Congress undertakes the annual Federal Budget review and approval, debates over how much defense spending is enough are already underway.  Despite the Administration sending a budget request exceeding $800 billion, the services still sent to Congress additional unfunded requirements totaling over $20 billion.  Conventional wisdom states that 70 percent of a DoD weapon systems costs reside in sustainment, with 30 percent going for acquisition.  Those entrusted with taking care of a DoD system are not responsible for the dollars to develop and build.  Therefore, the incentive to spend a dollar today in acquisition to save in sustaining in the future is lost.  Stewardship of taxpayers’ dollars should ensure that the next dollar spent goes to reducing future costs, not chasing buzz words or trendy sounding ideas.   

The Department of Defense has made some progress, designating the Defense Microelectronics Agency as the Center for Industrial and Technology Excellence (CITE) for Microelectronics. All DoD Acquisition, Sustainment, and Modernization program offices have direct access to the companies on the DMEA “Trusted Supplier” list. Most recently, DMEA accredited its first electronic design automation (EDA) company, that is the leader in digital microelectronics twinning.

While international affairs rightly dictate that we maintain a strong, well-equipped defense force, responsibility is also shared for ensuring our dollars are well spent.  Acquisition officials, program managers need to be better educated on commercial practices that drive results.  Congressional oversight needs to focus on incentivizing efficiency and sustainability at all levels of lifecycle costs.  Industry has responsibility also to help government clearly appreciate practices over buzz words, results over rhetoric.

Gregory T. Kiley, former senior professional staff member, Senate Armed Services Committee; and U.S. Air Force Officer